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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Junius Baugh appeals from the district court‟s decision granting the Navy‟s 
motion for summary judgment and denying Baugh‟s cross-motion for summary judgment 
on his Administrative Procedure Act claim.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I.  
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the 
underlying factual and procedural history of this dispute, we will only briefly set forth the 
factual and legal background of this litigation.  
In 1994, Baugh filed a petition with the Board for Correction of Naval Records 
(“BCNR” or the “Board”) requesting removal of certain fitness reports in his file.  A two-
member majority of the Board found “an injustice warranting removal of the contested 
fitness reports.”  J.A. 35.  The Board majority, therefore, recommended that the contested 
fitness reports be removed, but did “not consider it appropriate to authorize the ISIC 
[Immediate Senior/Superior in Command] to submit replacement fitness reports for the 
periods covered by the contested reports [because] . . . Petitioner did not specifically 
request this.”  J.A. 36.  Because the decision was not unanimous, the Board forwarded the 
petition to then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
Bernard Rostker, pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 723.6(e)(ii).   
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Thereafter, Rostker issued a memorandum stating that he concurred with the 
Board majority‟s decision.  However, Rostker ordered  
that replacement fitness reports be made by the immediate senior in command 
(ISIC) for the reasons suggested by the Military Personnel Evaluations and 
Correspondence Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.  While the Petitioner 
has not requested such a remedy, removal of the contested fitness reports would 
leave the Petitioner without any ratings for five years. 
 
J.A. 25.  Rostker directed as follows: 
Accordingly, two reports should be issued, one for the period 1 February 1993 to 
31 January 1994, and the second for the period 1 February to 8 July 1994, by the 
appropriate ISIC.  However, since the Board acts for a remedial purpose, the ISIC 
reports may not be filed in Petitioner‟s records if they are lower than the reports 
removed. 
 
Id.  After Assistant Secretary Rostker‟s directive, the Head Officer for Fitness Reports 
notified the Board, in a January 18, 1995 letter, that she had removed the fitness reports 
but was “unable to obtain substitute reports from the Immediate Superior in Command 
(ISIC).”  J.A. 40.  The ISIC, Rear Admiral Louise Wilmot (Ret.), never drafted 
replacement fitness reports because she had not met Baugh, and had no knowledge of his 
job performance.  She therefore thought it impossible for her to file substitute fitness 
reports as contemplated by Rostker‟s directive.  When personally contacted by the Navy, 
“[s]he stated that she had never met this officer, and therefore could not sign a fitness 
report for someone she did not know.”  J.A. 27.  Instead, on December 30, 1994, a 
Fitness Memorandum was placed in Baugh‟s file to cover the period of the removed 
reports.  J.A. 26.  The Fitness Memorandum stated: 
This memorandum is being filed in lieu of a fitness report for the above period.  
The Judge Advocate General has confirmed the legality of this procedure.  Subject 
report has been removed by order of the Secretary of the Navy in accordance with 
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provisions of Federal law and may not be made available to selection boards and 
reviewing authorities.  Such boards and authorities may not conjecture or draw 
any inference as to the nature of the report.  The overall performance of subject 
officer will be evaluated from the material presently available. 
 
Id. 
Although Baugh received a backdated promotion to Lieutenant Commander in 
May 1995, nearly four years later he sought replacement of the removed fitness reports.  
In a February 11, 1999 letter, Carolyn H. Becraft, the successor to Assistant Secretary 
Rostker, responded to Baugh‟s request.  J.A. 24.  Assistant Secretary Becraft “determined 
that replacement of the contested fitness reports is not practicable” because the ISIC 
“declined to submit replacement reports.”  Id.1  Accordingly, Becraft approved the 
previous decision to include a Fitness Memorandum in Baugh‟s file in lieu of the 
replacement reports.  Id.   
This suit followed.  Baugh alleges that the Navy‟s refusal to issue fitness reports to 
replace those purportedly tainted by discrimination and retaliation was arbitrary and 
capricious.  He seeks reinstatement and retroactive promotions, arguing that the absence 
of replacement fitness reports prevented his promotion to Commander.  As noted at the 
outset, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy and this appeal 
followed.
2
   
                                              
1
 After a request for reconsideration by Baugh‟s counsel, the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Personnel drafted a response letter recommending that Becraft adhere to her earlier 
decision that replacement fitness reports were “not practicable” and that it was 
“impossible at this time to comply with Dr. Rostker‟s memorandum.”  J.A. 27.  The 
record is unclear as to whether this letter was signed by Becraft and delivered to Baugh. 
2
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II. 
Our review of BCNR decisions is controlled by the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, which provides a right to judicial review for a “person suffering 
legal wrong because of agency action.”  5 U.S.C. § 702.  We must focus on the agency‟s 
decision making process, not the decision itself.  NVE, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2006).  We may only set aside agency actions, 
findings, and conclusions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).3  Generally, “[t]he scope 
of review under the „arbitrary and capricious‟ standard is narrow and a court is not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  Although the standard of review is 
deferential, the Navy must nevertheless demonstrate that it considered “„rational 
connections between the facts found and the choice made.‟”  Id. (citation omitted).   
III. 
Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1), “[t]he Secretary of a military department may 
correct any military record of the Secretary‟s department when the Secretary considers it 
necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.”  An order issued under 10 U.S.C.  
§ 1552 is “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States.”  Id. § 1552(a)(4).  
                                              
3
 “We exercise plenary review of a district court‟s order granting or denying summary 
judgment, applying the same standard as the district court . . . .” Tri–M Grp., LLC v. 
Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).  We will affirm only if “drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.  The same 
standards and burdens apply on cross-motions for summary judgment.  Appelmans v. City 
of Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987).   
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Thus, Rostker‟s November 22, 1994 memorandum constituted a “final and conclusive” 
order binding all officers of the United States.  In that memorandum, Assistant Secretary 
Rostker ordered the ISIC to take steps to correct  Baugh‟s record “due to an appearance 
of reprisal for a previous petition to the Board.”  J.A. 25.  The Navy argues that Rostker‟s 
memorandum was a conditional recommendation instead of a “final and conclusive” 
order.  We disagree.  The Assistant Secretary‟s order directed “that fitness reports be 
made by the immediate senior in command (ISIC).”  Id. (emphasis added).  The order 
contained no exceptions to its directive that ISIC Wilmot prepare fitness reports.  Instead, 
Rostker issued an unqualified order that the five-year gap in Baugh‟s record required the 
preparation of replacement fitness reports (save that fitness reports were not to be filed “if 
they are lower than the reports removed”).   
However, even assuming that ISIC Wilmot‟s failure to prepare replacement fitness 
reports violated Rostker‟s final and conclusive order, we agree that Baugh is not entitled 
to relief because ISIC Wilmot‟s decision was, in effect, ratified by Becraft‟s decision to 
approve the insertion of a Fitness Memorandum in lieu of replacement reports. 
A.  
Where, as here, the BCNR‟s decision is not unanimous, final decision-making 
authority as to what relief is appropriate vests in the Secretary of the Navy.  32 C.F.R.  
§ 723.6(e)(ii).
4
  When Assistant Secretary Rostker issued his decision pursuant to the 
recommendation of the BCNR, it became “final and conclusive” within the meaning of 
                                              
4
 The parties do not dispute that the Assistant Secretary may act on behalf of the 
Secretary.  See also Loeh v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 743, 748-49 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (citing 
32 C.F.R. § 700.320). 
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10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4).  While we reject the Navy‟s contention that it had “inherent 
power to reconsider or modify [its] prior decisions,”  see Appellee‟s Br. 34, n. 11, we 
hold that, under the unique circumstances here, Assistant Secretary Becraft had authority 
under 32 C.F.R. § 723.9 to reconsider Rostker‟s order.  That regulation states that, 
“[a]fter final adjudication, further consideration will be granted only upon presentation by 
the applicant of new and material evidence or other matter not previously considered by 
the Board.”  32 C.F.R. § 723.9 (emphasis added).  We do not construe Baugh‟s 
December 1, 1998 letter as a request for reconsideration, as he was merely seeking 
compliance with Rostker‟s order.  Rather, Baugh‟s letter prompted a review by Assistant 
Secretary Becraft that raised “matter[s] not previously considered by the Board.”  
Specifically, Becraft‟s review disclosed that Baugh‟s ISIC, Wilmot, did not know Baugh 
and thus could not issue replacement reports in good faith.  Rostker had specifically 
worded his November 22, 1994 order as follows: “I direct that replacement fitness reports 
be made by the immediate senior in command (ISIC)  . . .”.  J.A. 25 (emphasis added).  
Rostker could have directed the reports to be made by the ISIC “or his or her designee,” 
and thereby authorized the ISIC to designate someone familiar with Baugh‟s performance 
to file the report if the ISIC was not sufficiently familiar to comply with the order.  
However, Rostker‟s direct order left no room for such a substitution.   
This is a “matter not previously considered by the Board” in its recommendation, 
or by Rostker when he ordered that “two reports should be issued . . . by the appropriate 
ISIC.”  Id.  Thus, Assistant Secretary Becraft had authority under 32 C.F.R. § 723.9 to 
reconsider Assistant Secretary Rostker‟s order.   
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B.  
Given our very narrow scope of review under the APA, we need only consider 
whether Assistant Secretary Becraft‟s approval of  the insertion of a Fitness 
Memorandum in lieu of the replacement reports ordered by Rostker, pursuant to 32 
C.F.R. § 723.9, was arbitrary and capricious.  We find here that Becraft considered 
“rational connections between the facts found and the choice made.”  Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
After receiving Baugh‟s December 1, 1998 letter, Becraft conducted an 
independent review of Baugh‟s case.  She was cognizant of her predecessor‟s order—
directed to Baugh‟s ISIC and no one else—to issue replacement reports, and the 
limitation contained therein that replacement “„reports may not be filed in Baugh‟s 
records if they are lower than the reports removed.‟”  J.A. 24.  Thus, given ISIC 
Wilmot‟s unfamiliarity with Baugh and his job performance, Becraft determined “that 
replacement of the contested fitness reports is not practicable.”  J.A. 24.  In this context, 
we need not determine if ISIC Wilmot acted in error by failing to produce replacement 
fitness reports pursuant to Rostker‟s order.  Rather, we need only determine if Assistant 
Secretary Becraft, upon reconsideration of the order, had the ultimate authority to review 
and adjust the relief that had been ordered for Baugh and whether Becraft acted 
arbitrarily in approving placement of a Fitness Memorandum in Baugh‟s file in lieu of 
replacement reports.  We have no trouble concluding that Becraft‟s ultimate conclusions, 
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which were consistent with the recommendations of the BCNR majority,  J.A. 36, were a 
reasoned exercise of her authority under applicable Navy regulations.
5
   
V.  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the district court entering summary 
judgment in favor of the Navy.   
                                              
5
 We need not reach Baugh‟s final argument that the Board violated its mandate to 
provide him with whole relief, as that argument has been waived.  Moreover, given our 
discussion here, it is clear that the argument would fail. 
